I. Introduction

Models of corporate and investor behavior by Myers and Majluf (1984) John and Williams (1985),
, and Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) provide theoretical support for a relationship between the announcement effect of a common stock issue and information released by current period dividends or earnings announcements. Disclosure models by Verrecchia (1990) and an earnings timing model discussed in Trueman (1990) also lead to possible timing behavior around security offerings. These studies hypothesize that the firms' announcements change the information set available to equity investors, resulting in reevaluation of the firm's stock price.
The first goal of this article is to determine whether investors react differently to a security issue announcement that closely precedes earnings and dividend information versus offer announcements made recently after dividend and earnings releases. A corollary aim is to determine whether some managers time equity or debt The valuation effect of debt and equity issue announcements on stock price varies predictably with the timing of earnings and dividend reports. Issue announcements closely preceding current cash flow signals have more negative valuation effects. Straight debt announcements also have a significantly negative effect on stock price, when the offer announcement closely precedes earnings and dividend releases. The evidence is consistent with a separating equilibrium where better performing firms signal superior value by announcing equity offers shortly after dividend announcements. Poorer performers appear to time equity offers just before dividend signals, which in turn are more likely to be negative. This study draws on and extends similar empirical work by Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) and Dierkens (1991) . Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) (KLM) show that the equity issue announcement price decline is directly related to the amount of information asymmetry. Consequently, firms are more likely to issue equity when information asymmetry is lowest. This condition occurs immediately after an informative announcement, such as earnings. The longer the elapsed time since the last information release, the greater the potential information asymmetry. This implies that the price decline at an equity issue announcement date is an increasing function of the time in days since the last regular quarterly earnings announcement. In the KLM framework, the longer the time since the last earnings release, the more likely the issuing firm is of lower quality. They find a statistically weak linear relationship between the equity announcement abnormal return and the interval since the last earnings release. We document a stronger relationship between the price response of an equity issue announcement and the availability of prior dividend and earnings information. We also show that common stock abnormal returns associated with straight debt offer announcements reflect the timing of the firm's earnings and dividend announcements. Abnormal returns for straight debt offerings are significantly different from zero only when the offer announcement is not closely preceded by the earnings and dividend announcements.1 Dierkens (1991) also finds that the price decrease associated with an equity issue is directly related to various measures of information asymmetry. Since the level of asymmetry may be reduced by earnings releases that closely precede equity offers, a clustering of security offer announcements would be expected shortly after current earnings announcements. Both Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald and Dierkens find this phenomenon. Also, Dierkens reports that firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to issue equity soon after an 1. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict an insignificant abnormal return for announcements of riskless debt offerings and a negative abnormal return for risky debt. Previous research has generally not supported the prediction for risky straight debt. Our results are also consistent with Kross and Schroeder (1984) earnings release. Both studies find that earnings announcements preceding an equity issue are more informative than earnings announcements following an equity issue. We document similar clustering of both debt and equity offer announcements after dividend and earnings releases; however, we find no differences in the informativeness of pre-versus postissue earnings. This result is consistent with Palepu (1987, 1990) , who find no relationship between equity offer announcements and subsequent changes in earnings. Brous (1992) also reports that equity announcements do not signal a downward revision in analysts' earnings forecasts. Alternatively, Hansen and Crutchley (1990) show that external financing announcements signal long-term earnings declines.
The predictions of the KLM and Dierkens models should hold with any information release, though their empirical tests consider only the effect of earnings announcements. The current study considers the conditioning effect of both dividend and earnings releases on equity and debt offer announcements.2 Equity and debt offer abnormal returns are more negative for longer intervals between the offer announcement and the prior release of dividend information. Subsequent dividend changes are more likely to be negative when equity (but not debt) issue announcements are more distant from prior dividend announcements. These results are consistent with managerial timing and investors' reactions provided by Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) , who show that managers tend to postpone decreases in dividends. Abnormal returns for equity offer announcements are not affected by the timing of the earnings release. Thus, the equity issue announcement timing appears to contain a dividend information effect but not an earnings information effect. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald's finding of an earnings effect may reflect the dividend phenomenon since they did not specifically control for dividends. Consistent with their earnings information effect, we do find a significant earnings release effect of the appropriate sign with debt issues.
Our The current study finds a more negative issue announcement valuation effect when the offer announcement closely precedes the current period dividend announcement. Negative dividend changes also occur more frequently when the equity offer announcement precedes the dividend release. We do not directly test the appropriateness of specific signaling models or attempt to distinguish between them. A general implication of several signaling models is examined on whether investor's offer announcements reactions differ in a predictable manner when information asymmetry levels differ between investors and managers.
Section II provides hypotheses concerning the conditional signaling environment tested. Section III outlines the sample selection procedure, methodology, and descriptive statistics of the samples. Section IV presents the results for both the stock and debt sample and examines differences in earnings and dividend changes based on signal sequence. Section V concludes the article. An Appendix outlines the nature of revealing signals in a simple Miller and Rock (1985) framework.
II. Testable Implications of the Effect of Signal Sequence
The information effect of a given signal is a function of the signal content and (we hypothesize) the signal's sequence relative to the announcement of other information releases. We test whether releasing the earnings and dividend information to the public shortly before the offer announcement changes how investors interpret the announcement of a security offering. 
III. Sample and Methodology
A. Sample Selection
The firms selected for the sample were obtained from the Registered Offering Statistics (ROS) tape compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). All common stock and straight debt issues from 1971 through part of 1986 were initially considered. Announce-5. In another test (unreported), no evidence of a relationship between relative offer size and abnormal returns was found. Therefore, the size variable was omitted in further analysis. This is consistent with Dierkens's (1991) results. ment dates for security issues are the earlier of (i) the day the security is registered with the SEC or (ii) the day the issue appears in the Wall Street Journal, as announced in the Wall Street Journal Index. Because of the uncertainty in precisely identifying when the market receives the news, the standard 2-day event period is used, consisting of days -1 and 0. All issue announcements from the ROS tape were verified with the Wall Street Journal Index. The following additional screens are applied. 
where Xq is the quarterly earnings nearest to the security issue announcement. The absolute value of Xq -I is used in the few cases where Xq-1 is negative. Tests rederived with these observations omitted provide qualitatively similar results. Abnormal returns are generated via a market model using standard event-study methodology similar to Mikkelson and Partch (1986) . Because of the use of a 2-day event period, all time intervals in the estimation period are also 2-day periods.7 Each abnormal return is treated as a prediction error and standardized according to Johnston (1984) . Tests of differences of portfolio average standardized prediction errors (ASPEs) between portfolios 1 through 4 are conducted using a simple dummy variable regression on the portfolio partitions. For example, to determine whether ASPE, from portfolio 1 differs from ASPE4 for portfolio 4, the following regression is estimated,
where observation i is in either portfolio j = 1 or 4. The value SPE1 is the standardized prediction error for observation i, and bji is a binary indicator variable equal to one when observation i is drawn from portfolio j = 1 and equal to zero if the observation is from portfolio j = 4. The value ASPE4 is given by a in equation ( 
C. Sample Description and Demographics
The final sample consists of 579 straight debt offerings and 191 common stock offerings. The distributions of offerings per year for the initial and screened samples are provided in table 2. The 2-day mean prediction error (unstandardized) for the equity issue sample is -2.84% and is significant at the 1% level.9 The mean prediction error of -0.17% for the debt sample is not significant at the 10% level. These findings are consistent with prior research where equity issue announcements result in negative abnormal returns of about -3% and straight debt issue announcements result in an insignificant mean abnormal return.
The mean dividend change for the stock sample is -1.74% (significant at the 1% level), while the average dividend change is 1.87% for the debt sample (significant at the 10% level). The average earnings change for the stock sample is 9.20% (significant at the 1% level), while the mean earnings change in the debt sample is 1.60% (insignificant). Thus, stock issues on average appear to have a contemporaneous decrease in dividends and an increase in earnings. Earnings increases in prior periods were not examined, precluding conclusions on whether earnings changes are different from expectations. However, since dividend decreases are uncommon (Eades, Hess, and Kim 1985), the mean dividend decrease for the equity sample probably does represent an unexpected change. Table 3 contains sample sizes for the four portfolio partitions. In both the stock and debt samples, the majority of observations, 39.3% and 42.7%, respectively, are found in portfolio 1, where earnings and dividends precede security issue announcements. A one-way chisquare test for both the stock (X2 = 13.248, p-value < .01) and debt (X2 = 54.045, p-value < .01) issue samples rejects the null of equal portfolio size over the four portfolios. There is some clustering of both types of external financing announcements after information releases. Loderer and Mauer (1992) point out that this does not necessarily imply managers voluntarily time security issues relative to earnings and dividend announcements for signaling reasons. The earnings, dividend, and issue decisions are often collectively made at a quarterly meeting of the board of directors. They argue that the issue process may require postponing the issue announcement until terms are finalized, while there may be no reason to delay the earnings and dividend announcements. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-4, 3-4) for the stock issue sample. Each comparison is made by subtracting the mean AR of the lower number portfolio from the mean of the higher number portfolio. Under the sequential timing hypothesis, the absolutely smallest abnormal returns are expected to occur in portfolio 1. Even though portfolio 3 exhibits the absolutely smallest mean AR in panel A, the difference between 1 and 3 is not significant. The sequential timing hypothesis also predicts that the absolute value of the portfolio 4 mean AR should be greater than any of the other portfolios since B should be more informative when it precedes both D and X. Hence, the comparisons 1-4, 2-4, and 3-4 should be negative and significant. Two of the three comparisons are negative and significant, while the comparison 2-4 is negative but not significant. The timing of the dividend signal appears to "condition" the stock offering abnormal return, while the timing of the prior release of the earnings signal does not. The remaining comparisons will be significant only if information imparted by the prior dividend differs from information provided by the prior earnings. Comparison 2-3 is insignificant, though there is a 1.06% performance disadvantage when the dividend signal is last. This is of the same scale as the significant 1.07% difference for comparison 1-4. Even though not significant, the sign and size of the difference is consistent with comparisons 1-4 and 3-4. The delay of the dividend until after the equity announcement appears to be received more negatively than the delay of earnings.
Tukey joint tests also confirm the above results. The mean abnormal return is not different when earnings precede equity offers (portfolios 1 and 2) and earnings follow equity offers (portfolios 3 and 4). However, the null hypothesis of no difference in abnormal returns is rejected at the 5% level when dividends precede equity offers (portfolios 1 and 3) versus observations where dividends follow equity offers (portfolios 2 and 4).
A supplemental test is performed where tighter, or more restricted, pre-to postearnings and dividend announcement windows are examined. This test uses only (i) equity issues that had either a prior dividend and earnings announcement within 30 trading days of the issue announcement and no subsequent dividend and earnings announcement for 30 trading days after the issue announcement or (ii) issues that subsequently announced dividend and earnings within 30 trading days after the issue announcement and did not announce dividend or earnings for 30 trading days before the issue announcement. This restriction reduces the sample size to 91 observations. The choice of 30 days is somewhat arbitrary. Choosing a shorter interval such as 20 days reduces the sample size from 91 to 63 observations. The four portfolios then have too few observations to detect differences in abnormal returns between portfolios.
Results for the reduced sample indicate that comparisons 1-4 and 3-4 are still significant at the 5% level, while all other comparisons are insignificant. Timing of earnings appears to have limited effect on the information content of equity issues, while dividend timing affects equity offer abnormal returns. The abnormal return results are also compared with the findings of Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald. They report a weak statistical (albeit an economically significant) negative relationship between the length of time since the prior earnings release and the equity issue announcement. We calculate the number of trading days between the prior earnings and dividend announcements and the equity announcement for the refined sample and estimate the following regression model:
where DBDPi for observation i is the minimum of (1) the number of trading days between the prior earnings announcement and the issue announcement or (2) the number of trading days between the prior dividend announcement and the issue announcement. The estimate of ot is negative and significant at the 5% level and the ,B estimate is significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that the longer the time interval since the last information release, the greater the stock price decline associated with an equity offering. By incorporating the dividend announcement into the prior information set, we are able to find a much stronger statistical relationship than Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald between the interval since the last information release and the equity offer abnormal return.
B. Signal Sequence and Straight Debt Announcement Abnormal Returns
The results for the debt sample in panel A of table 5 are supportive of the sequential signaling hypothesis. The mean ARs for portfolios 1, 2, and 3 when D and/or X precede B are not significantly different from zero. In contrast, the mean AR for portfolio 4, where B is not partially revealed by either prior signal, is -0.67% and is significant at the 1% level. An examination of portfolio medians provides similar results. In panel B of table 5, differences between mean ARs for the debt portfolios are presented. The comparisons 1-4, 2-4, and 3-4 are all negative and significant at the 5% level, while 1-3 is significant at the 10% level. A prior announcement of earnings, dividends, or both leads to insignificant mean ARs associated with the announcement of a debt offering. The Tukey joint tests provide evidence that the differences in ARs are primarily due to the timing of the dividend announcements. This result is consistent with our evidence on equity offer announcements. Abnormal returns do not differ based on whether earnings precede (portfolios 1 and 2) or follow (portfolios 3 and 4) debt offers. When dividends follow debt offers (portfolios 2 and 4), the debt offer announcement results in a significantly more negative mean AR than when dividends precede debt offers (portfolios 1 and 3). A supplemental test examines debt issues having less than 30-day "prior" versus less than 30-day "post" dividend and earnings announcements. Results are qualitatively similar to the results in panel B of table 5, except the 1-3 comparison is no longer marginally significant.
Equation (4) is also estimated for the refined debt sample. The estimated intercept is significantly positive and the slope estimate is sig-nificantly negative (at the 5% and 1% level, respectively).'0 The debt offers SPEs are, on average, positive for short intervals of up to 15 days, but decline with interval length.
A plausible implication is that a signal-to-issue debt, if devoid of earnings and dividend information content, is received positively. Investors interpret the news that the firm is seeking debt financing less favorably the longer the time interval between the last information release and the debt offer announcement." Tests of differences in medians do not change the conclusions for either the debt or equity sam- 12. In supplemental tests, the sign of earnings and dividend changes are not related to the offer SPE within each portfolio in either the debt or equity offer samples. The effect is apparently a timing phenomenon. Comparisons between the portfolios in the equity sample also substantiate the dividend timing phenomenon. Negative differences in the mean dividend changes are found in comparisons 1-2, 1-4 (significant at the 5% level), and 3-4 (significant at the 10% level) in the stock sample in panel B of table 7. On average, dividend decreases are larger when the dividend announcement is postponed until after the security issue announcement.
The sign of comparison 2-3 leads to the same conclusion. When managers announce only earnings and not dividends before the security issue announcement, investors revise upward their expectations of the likelihood of a dividend decrease. Managers appear to postpone bad news until after the offering.'3 Investors also seem to be aware of this timing phenomenon.
The significant mean dividend increase found in portfolio 3 relative to portfolio 1 of the stock sample also may represent managerial timing of dividend increases relative to the security announcement in order to ameliorate the negative effect of the issue before reporting a relative (nonsignificant) change in earnings of -2.38%. Investors appear to react as John and Williams (1985) suggest.
Next, the effect of timing of earnings announcements relative to common stock issue announcements is considered. In panel A of table 7, significant increases in earnings are found only in portfolios 1 and 2. The earnings announcement precedes the issue announcement in these portfolios. However, the comparisons in panel B demonstrate that there are no significant differences in earnings changes regardless of the timing of the earnings announcement. The effect on the offer AR of delaying the earnings release is also not as negative as the effect 13. The mean number of days from the announcement to the subsequent dividend (earnings) announcement after adjusting for outliers is 36 (33) days. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report a median of 16 days from offer announcement to completion; hence, most offers are probably completed prior to the subsequent earnings and dividend announcement. of postponing the dividend announcement.'4 For the debt sample, the mean dividend and earnings changes are insignificantly different from zero in all four portfolios, and there are no significant differences in the average dividend or earnings changes in any portfolio.
V. Conclusions
Investors react to security offers in a manner consistent with the implications of signaling models provided by John and Williams (1985) and Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) . Generally, the earlier the security issue announcement in the set of three announcements, the greater is its negative value effect. Managers should be aware that not only the signal content but also the timing of the signal affects how investors will react to a given information release. Most equity and straight debt issue announcements are made shortly after earnings and dividend releases. However, managers are more likely to announce an equity issue before a dividend decline. Regardless of signal sequence, equity issue announcements are interpreted as bad news by investors. However, the abnormal return differences indicate that investors discount the stock price more heavily when the equity issue announcement precedes the dividend release. This justifiable response is related to a higher probability of receiving "bad" dividend news. This suggests a possible separating equilibrium between better and weaker firms. Better performing firms seem to be able to differentiate themselves from weaker firms by announcing positive or zero dividend changes prior to an equity offer announcement. Superior performing firms would then mitigate the agency costs arising from the lemons phenomenon proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) by releasing current period cash flow information before the offer announcement.
This type of timing behavior is not observed around straight debt offer announcements. However, the information content of a debt offer announcement still does vary based on the sequence of signals. Sig-14. As a check on our assumption of a naive expectations model for earnings and dividends, we also estimated XI and DU by calculating the standardized abnormal returns for the dividend and earnings announcements. Using ordinary least squares, we tested whether these proxy measures of the unexpected earnings and dividends differed among the portfolios. No significant differences were found. This is consistent with an efficient market. This implies that the timing of security offering announcements provides the distinguishing value affecting marginal information in this set of three signals. We also tested for differences in informativeness using the absolute value of the standardized dividend and earnings ARs and found no difference. Compared to table 7 results, however, we should have at least found a significant positive AR for earnings in portfolio 1 if our observed table 7 unexpected earnings were truly unexpected by investors. Possibly, the greater noise in the AR measure may contribute to the difference in results. Similar to Loderer and Mauer (1992), we found no relationship between signal sequence and Miller and Rock's net dividend measure. nificant negative abnormal returns occur for straight debt offers only when the offer announcement closely precedes both the current earnings and dividend releases.
